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LEGITIMATION BY CONSTITUTION 
(AND THE NEWS FROM SOUTH AFRICA) 
Frank I. Michelman* 
Where frequent, obdurate, reasonable disagreement over the wisdom and the 
justice of statutes and government decrees is an accepted fact of political life, 
justification for the force of law may come to rest on the idea that the laws and 
decrees, however sharply and reasonably contested, gain a kind of immunity 
against justified complaint from the fact of their having issued in compliance 
with the terms of a good, right, or accepted constitution.  My lecture will draw 
from recent events and debates in South Africa, in a consideration of possible 
limits (or objections) to such a constitution-based principle of political 
justification.1 
 
How do we justify the force of law to people at large, in countries 
where populations often find themselves divided over whether the law 
is truly right and as it ought to be?  As you can see from my little blurb 
for this talk, reproduced above, my title “Legitimation by Constitution” 
refers to a certain line of thought that often crops up in both academic 
and lay discussions of this question.  My blurb calls this a “constitution-
based principle” of legal justification, and it says that my lecture will 
submit this idea to testing by recent events and debates in South Africa. 
That promise will be kept.  Before I finish, I will be suggesting how 
current happenings in South Africa suggest certain limiting conditions 
on the prospects for legitimation by constitution.  By way of illustration, 
                                                 
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. Thanks to the Edward A. 
Seegers Lecture Series, and to the Dean, Faculty, and students of the Valparaiso University 
School of Law, for the opportunity to share these thoughts and for gracious hospitality. 
1  Reprinted just above is my advance billing for the Edward A. Seegers Lecture, 
delivered on November 13, 2009, at Valparaiso University School of Law.  I offer the 
Lecture text as given, expanded slightly in a few places.  I have added footnotes only for 
purposes of attributing quoted material and exemplifying current South African 
controversies—and in a few spots, to indicate where fuller discussion of some themes and 
ideas may be found. 
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I will spend some time reflecting on the status and treatment, in South 
African constitutionalism’s New Deal, of African indigenous law. 
Doing so should fit the occasion, because the question of respect for 
indigenous law—or what is often called “customary” law—is very much 
a question of civil rights.2  To those South Africans whose lives are 
wrapped up with traditional ways of living, South Africa’s Constitution 
guarantees important civil rights of cultural association and self-
determination.  At the same time, the Constitution guarantees to 
everyone in the country civil rights of equality and freedom from 
discrimination.  One might think, especially here, of the fraction of 
“everyone” who are women,3 but of course men, too, have direct stakes 
(I mean, apart from the stakes that all citizens hold in matters of basic 
justice) in the question of the civil rights of members of traditional 
communities.4  South African officials, judges included, face the 
challenge of discovering, constructing, or inducing a potential for 
compatibility between respect for traditional forms and practices of life 
and law and civic equality regardless of sex or gender.  Recent work of 
the South African Constitutional Court is interestingly suggestive along 
these lines, and I will examine it. 
First, though, I need to take some time unpacking the idea of 
legitimation by constitution, so that we will be able, by the end, to see 
how South Africa’s indigenous-law question relates to it.  Systems of 
legal ordering always invite a question of justification or legitimacy.5  We 
want to understand how to justify the demands we make on each other 
in the name of the law.  Demands, I mean, that we back with threats of 
force; demands we make for everyone’s regular compliance with the 
laws of the country, and of course that includes compliance by those 
                                                 
2  The Lecture was scheduled as a curtain-raiser for a day-long conference on “Civil 
Rights in the Obama Era.” 
3  For an introduction to the apparent tensions in South Africa between claims to civil 
equality and to respect for indigenous law, and for citations to major South African 
sources, see generally Penelope E. Andrews, Who’s Afraid of Polygamy? Exploring the 
Boundaries of Family, Equality and Custom in South Africa, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 351. 
4  Consider, for example, current controversy over the constitutional and other 
appropriate limits, if any, on oversight by state health and police authorities of the conduct 
of ritual circumcision by traditional leaders and communities.  See, e.g., Chiefs at Odds With 
Youth Over Circumcision, THE HERALD ONLINE, Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.theherald.co. 
za/article.aspx?id=496080; Judgment in Forced Circumcision Case, LEGALBRIEF TODAY, Oct. 
14, 2009, http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20091014084902414 (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2010). 
5  For a fuller presentation of the idea of legitimation by constitution, and its association 
with a branch of contemporary liberal political philosophy, see Frank I. Michelman, 
Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts, 66 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2003).  A full set of citations 
to my writings on this topic can be found in Frank I. Michelman, Reply to Ming-Sung Kuo, 7 
I-CON 715, 715 n.1 (2009). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/1
2010] Legitimation by Constitution 1017 
who might not like or approve of all the laws that get made.  One answer 
to this sort of question, which has apparently proved appealing in many 
contemporary societies, is that demands for legal compliance are 
justified as long as the laws in question issue from a general system for 
lawmaking and legal administration—a constitutional regime—that 
everyone can fairly be called on to accept. 
On this view, justification for the force of a law depends on whether 
that law issued from what we may call a “legitimation-worthy” 
constitution.  To call a constitution legitimation-worthy, in this sense, is 
to say that its prescriptions, including both its procedural provisions for 
democratic government and its substantive requirements of respect for 
basic rights, have a special kind of merit.  Namely, they cast a mantle of 
moral probity over enforcement against everyone of approximately all of 
the laws that come properly out of the system they constitute.  A 
legitimation-worthy constitution is one whose terms are such as to allow 
you or me to say, with clear conscience, that any law whose process of 
enactment, and whose content, pass muster under that constitution’s 
requirements can ipso facto be deemed a law that all within range have 
good enough reason to accept, even if they disagree with it.  Such a 
proposition, if accepted, diverts the burden of justification from the 
particular law in question to the legally constituted political system that 
produced it. 
“Well, but how is that supposed to help?” you might ask.  In 
societies as culturally and otherwise diverse as the ones we are talking 
about, mustn’t we expect disagreement over what should have gone into 
the constitution, no less than disagreement about the merits of one or 
another piece of current legislation?  In response, theorists may suggest 
reasons why that need not be so.  For one thing, they may say, 
constitutions are primarily about procedures for lawmaking and other 
aspects of governance, not the substantive contents of laws, and people 
who have trouble agreeing about the substantive merits of specific laws 
may find it a lot easier to agree on what qualifies as a fair process for 
democratic governance and public decision-making.  Additionally, when 
constitutions do talk about people’s substantive rights, they usually do 
so at a pretty high level of abstraction.  They speak, for example, of a 
right of “equality before the law.”  It seems that just about everyone can 
agree on a constitutional commitment to equality before the law and 
actually feel reassured by that commitment, even if they know they will 
not agree on all the relevant, concrete issues of implementation, such as 
affirmative action, for example.  And so, maybe we all can call upon each 
other to accept that a given constitution contains an apt and fair set of 
general, framework rules for governance in a diverse population of free 
Michelman: Legitimation by Constitution (and the News from South Africa)
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
1018 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
and equal persons whose various aims, hopes, and projects will often 
come into conflict. 
Now, try this on for size: 
The Republic of South Africa is . . . [a] democratic state 
founded on the following values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms.  
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, . . . regular elections and a multi-
party system of democratic government . . . . 
That comes from the section on founding values of the republic in 
South Africa’s current Constitution.6  You can rest assured that the rest 
of the document is more or less aptly drafted to carry out the program.  
In fact, it has supported constitutional rulings and (where required) 
resultant legislation prohibiting the death penalty,7 abolishing the crime 
of sodomy,8 upholding affirmative action,9 instituting gay marriage,10 
extending social security benefits to non-citizens,11 tightly restricting 
residential evictions,12 recasting and expanding AIDS treatment policy,13 
and enforcing multi-cultural tolerance in schools,14 among other things 
(and the recital could go on and on).  The Constitution’s chief expositor, 
South Africa’s Constitutional Court, has achieved, over the first fifteen 
years of its existence, a remarkable international reputation and 
standing, not only as one of the world’s notably skilled, informed, and 
adept constitutional tribunals, but as one of those whose work helps to 
set terms and standards for constitutional adjudication around the globe.  
Sound good? 
Today, in South Africa, one picks up rumblings of the possibility of 
constitutional failure.  I do not mean rumblings only on the right, from 
observers who find themselves disturbed and alarmed by rulings of the 
                                                 
6  S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 1. 
7  See S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
8  See Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. 
Afr.). 
9  See Minister of Fin. v. Van Heerden, 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
10  See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
11  See Khosa v. Minister of Soc. Dev., 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
12  See, e.g., Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers, 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (S. 
Afr.). 
13  See, e.g., Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. 
Afr.). 
14  M.E.C. for Educ., KwaZulu-Natal v. Pillay, 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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kinds I have mentioned.  I also mean rumblings from what can only be 
called the left, as I’ll explain soon.  Some people are having serious 
second thoughts about South Africa’s constitutional “miracle”—as it was 
called in those heady years of the nineties when it seemed to the world 
that South Africa had, by an amazing feat of constitution-creation, 
transformed itself into the southern hemisphere’s model constitutional-
democratic regime.15  Please do not misunderstand me.  I am not here as 
a doomsayer.  I am not among the rumblers.  But the rumbles are there, 
and they demand attention from all who strive to understand the puzzle 
of legitimation by constitution. 
In South Africa, today, one hears intimations of crisis.  Thoughtful 
observers notice “disturbing signs pointing towards the decline of 
constitutionalism,” including worries over whether the governing 
authorities may have “failed to internalise the precepts of the 
constitutional state.”16  Prominent figures voice doubts about the future 
of the rule of law and constitutional government in that country.17  
Observers talk of a “spiral of despondency” among jurists, accentuated 
by a recent spate of withdrawals by some highly regarded judges from 
consideration for appointment to the country’s top courts.18 
I cannot here describe, in any detail, the recent events that have 
apparently helped to spark and spread these concerns.  They have 
included controversial prosecutions of high officials;19 also some 
resulting very public and ugly brawls, not only among constituted 
branches of the state, but among judges and between courts.20  There is 
                                                 
15  See, e.g., HASSAN IBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION:  CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 3 (1998). 
16  Francois Venter, Liberal Democracy:  The Unintended Consequence—South African 
Constitution-Writing Propelled by the Winds of Globalisation, S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 
(forthcoming). 
17  See Adam Dodek, State v. Zuma:  The Future of Constitutional Democracy in South Africa, 
3 J. P. POL. L. 121, 128 (2009) (writing of an impending “battle over constitutionalism”); De 
Klerk warns of bending Constitution to the will of the ANC, LEGALBRIEF TODAY, Oct. 13, 2009, 
available at http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20091013083540332 (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2010) (reporting remarks of former President F. W. De Klerk, expressing concern 
about partisan-political take-over of the Constitution). 
18  See Judges Caught in ‘Spiral of Despondency,’ LEGALBRIEF TODAY, Sept. 18, 2009, 
http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20090918085146901 (last visited Mar. 24, 
2010); Franny Rabkin, Another Judge Gives Up On JSC Interviews, BUS. DAY, Sept. 17, 2009, 
available at http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=81678 (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2010). 
19  For an account of events surrounding the prosecution, on charges of corruption, of 
Jacob Zuma, see Dodek, supra note 17. 
20  For reviews of the most prominent inter-judicial controversy, see Theunis Roux, The 
South African Constitutional Court and the Hlophe Controversy, International and 
Comparative Perspectives on Constitutional Law, Paper Delivered at Centre for 
Comparative Studies 21st Anniversary Celebration, Melbourne, (Nov. 27, 2009); Penelope 
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also deep controversy over the conduct of the body which acts as the 
country’s agency for judicial discipline and for screening judicial 
appointments, both in response to those brawls21 and in producing its 
most recent slates of nominees for high judicial office.22  Also, South 
Africa has witnessed a barrage of disturbingly intemperate, even 
physically threatening, outbursts from some social leaders displeased by 
court proceedings.23  Legislative initiatives from the government24 and 
statements from high-ranking officials,25 are found by some observers to 
convey both a contempt for judicial independence and a hostility toward 
the judiciary, or at least that part of it that acts as the main, judicial 
keeper of the Constitution. 
This recent turmoil surely reflects tensions and anxieties that go back 
a long way, some of them clearly and sadly divisive along lines of race, 
class, and culture.26  There have been tensions over the pace at which, 
and the means by which, the higher judiciary and upper ranks of the 
legal profession are being repopulated by the formerly-excluded and 
subjugated peoples;27 tensions over moves by the government to take 
control of judicial administration and training;28 tensions over the role of 
the courts in prodding and steering constitutionally-committed social 
development and resource redistribution;29 tensions over judge-led 
                                                                                                             
Andrews, The Judiciary in South Africa:  Independence or Illusion 30–33 (Working Paper, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1279225. 
21  See, e.g., Franny Rabkin, Hlophe Decision a ‘Threat to the Rule of Law,’ BUS. DAY, Oct. 15, 
2009, available at http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=84037 (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2010) (reporting reactions to the decision of the Judicial Service 
Commission not to proceed with a full investigation of charges and counter-charges 
between Judge Hlophe and the justices of the Constitutional Court). 
22  See, e.g., Editorial, Sitting in Judgment MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, Sept. 25, 2009, 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-09-25-sitting-in-judgment (last visited Mar. 24, 2010). 
23  See Andrews, supra note 20, at 33–34; Dodek, supra note 17, at 133; Malema Doesn’t 
Budge on Zuma Remark, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, June 21, 2008, http://www.mg.co.za/ 
article/2008-06-21-malema-doesnt-budge-on-zuma-remark (last visited Mar. 24, 2010). 
24  See, e.g., Sello Alcock, Tackling Transformation of the Judiciary, MAIL AND GUARDIAN 
ONLINE, June 12, 2009, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-06-12-tackling-transformation 
-of-the-judiciary (last visited Mar. 24, 2010). 
25  See Moshoeshoe Monare, Zuma Takes Aim at Top Judges, THE STAR, Apr. 9, 2009, 
available at http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=6&art_id=vn200904090 
50224266C609125 (last visited Mar. 24, 2010). 
26  See Andrews, supra note 20, at 34–35. 
27  See id.; Prakash Naidoo, The Judiciary:  Trying Times, FINANCIAL MAIL, Oct. 23, 2009, 
http://secure.financialmail.co.za/09/1023/cover/coverstory.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 
2010). 
28  See Andrews, supra note 20, at 28–30; Venter, supra note 16. 
29  See, e.g., Bernard Ngoepe, Choosing New Custodians of Our Constitution, TIMES LIVE, 
Aug. 30, 2009, available at http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article34943.ece (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2010) (Bernard Ngoepe is a South African high court judge-president). 
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intrusions, in the name of the Constitution and its progressive-liberal 
values, into entrenched, customary forms of social life;30 and so on. 
As I tick off that list of sore points, you might think that those don’t 
seem to go beyond the stresses that would necessarily have to attend any 
process of conversion of the old, absolutist, apartheid state into a new, 
egalitarian, constitutional-democratic society.  Sure, South Africa is 
enduring the obduracy of poverty, of deprivation, of crime.  The pace of 
promised redistributions of access can seem slow; it is slow.  The country 
suffers from the persistence of suspicion and mistrust across racial and 
cultural divides, and doubtless that is aggravated by the country’s 
failure, so far, to transcend one-party government and achieve the multi-
party, democratic contestation promised by the Constitution.31  And 
sure, these conditions are bound to generate a certain amount of 
resentment, anxiety, and bad temper. But what they signal are failures 
and shortfalls of public administration and of societal mobilization, not a 
crisis of law or of the Constitution. 
Something like that would be the view of many, maybe most, 
informed South Africans,32 and I harbor no conviction to the contrary.  
One does, however, notice the presence in the conversation of trends of 
thought more radically inclined, toward asking whether current rifts 
might possibly stem from deep faults of the Constitution.  The faults 
suggested pertain both to constitutional substance and to the processes 
by which the constitution was created and brought into force.33  On the 
side of substance, one finds charges of failures of justice and failures of 
fitness.  The Constitution simply fails, some say—and fails largely by 
reason of its westernized constructions of human rights—to carry out the 
                                                 
30  See, e.g., id.; supra note 4. 
31  See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 1(d) (including, among the founding values of the Republic, 
a commitment to “a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness”). 
32  See, e.g., Dispute Hasn’t Placed Judiciary in Crisis, DAILY DISPATCH ONLINE, Sept. 23, 
2009, http://www.dispatch.co.za/article.aspx?id=347040 (last visited Mar. 24, 2010) 
(reporting remarks of Johan Froneman, a widely respected judge, since then appointed to 
the Constitutional Court). 
33  For a crisp summary of recent colloquy concerning alleged faults in the Constitution, 
its origins, and its administration, see Kenneth Walker, At the Heart of South Africa:  A 
Constitution and a Court, 4 CARNEGIE REP. no. 2 (Spring 2007), available at 
http://www.carnegie.org/reporter/14/constitution/index.html.  Recent, thoughtful 
essays by law professors Francois Venter and Henk Botha start out by asking whether an 
“apparent deterioration in South African constitutionalism” should be “ascribed to the 
manner in which the Constitution was written” (Venter), or whether “the roots of the 
current malaise” are to be found in “the constitution-making process itself” (Botha). Venter, 
supra note 16; Henk Botha, Instituting Public Freedom or Extinguishing Constituent Power?  
Reflections on South Africa’s Constitution-Making Experiment Paper delivered at the 
International Workshop on Constitution-Making, University of Glasgow, May 27−28, 2009. 
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first, most necessary task of restorative justice, which is re-vesting full 
possession of the country, and unhindered sovereignty over it, in the 
peoples whose land and living space it once was, prior to a long series of 
unjust colonial and imperial acts of dispossession.34 
One aspect of this injustice, the argument continues, is the 
Constitution’s move to take its stand on liberal rights that clash with 
deep-seated, identity-fixing cultural contexts and, more generally, to 
enact for the country a westernized, individual-centered idealization of 
social relations that is alien to the more communalistic disposition, 
characteristically African, that runs deep in the practices, customs, 
minds, and feelings of the bulk of the population.35  A constitutional 
project lacking in justness and fitness is doomed from the start, some 
critics may be taken to suggest.  Others, not in contradiction of the first 
group, place more emphasis on faults they perceive in the Constitution’s 
processes of origination, which some see as having been externally 
pressured, tactical, elite-dominated, legalistic and juridified, only 
shallowly populist and participatory, and insufficiently so to ground the 
sort of popular buy-in from Day One that these critics suggest may be 
essential for prospects of long-term constitutional legitimacy.36 
Questions of this kind, about the justice and fitness for all the people 
of South Africa of the Constitution and its birthing, enter a rich and 
important set of debates in constitutional theory and political analysis.37  
We cannot really pursue those themes in earnest today, however.  
Instead, the focus now must shift to the view of critics who, finding no 
fault with the Constitution that the country so triumphantly embraced in 
1994, trace the current malaise to alleged misreadings and 
misapplications of the people’s constitutional program by officials and 
by judges, very much including the Constitutional Court. 
                                                 
34  See M.B. Ramose, In Memoriam; Sovereignty and the “New” South Africa, 16 GRIFFITH L. 
REV. 310 (2007); Mogobe B. Ramose, An African Perspective on Justice and Race, POLYLOG 
themes 3 (2001), http://them.polylog.org/3/frm-en.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2010). 
35  See, e.g., Ramose, In Memoriam; Sovereignty and the “New” South Africa, supra note 34; 
Ramose, An African Perspective on Justice and Race, supra note 34; Jean Comaroff & John 
Comaroff, The Struggle Between the Constitution and “Things African,” WISER REV., No. 1, p. 6 
(July, 2004), available at http://wiserweb.wits.ac.za/PDF%20Files/review-no1.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2010). 
36  Concerns of this kind are taken up for examination by Venter, supra note 16, and 
Botha, supra note 33. 
37  Some of the fruits, including essays cited above by Venter and Botha, are collected in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEARNING:  ESSAYS TOWARDS A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF CONSTITUTION-
MAKING AND CONSTITUTIONALISATION AS LEARNING PROCESSES (provisional title) (Johan 
Van der Walt ed., forthcoming).  A leading precursor is JAMES TULLY, STRANGE 
MULTIPLICITY:  CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/1
2010] Legitimation by Constitution 1023 
In the recent verbal hostilities, the Constitutional Court has certainly 
taken its share of flak.  The Court receives complaint for excessive 
intrusion into governmental operations38 (and also, I might add, for the 
opposite fault of excessive reticence39); for failure to institute effective 
dialogue between itself and the citizenry; for constitutionalizing an 
extremity of liberal permissiveness (as the critics see it) in the areas, for 
example, of crime control and of sex that the critics apparently doubt the 
Constitution truly calls for;40 and for a want of urgency about the vital 
necessity of integrating indigenous African values into the development 
of South African constitutional law.41 
I report the circulation of such views; I do not endorse them.  That 
the Constitutional Court should have come in for some degree of such 
complaint was inevitable.  As is necessarily true when constitutions are 
drafted in conditions of sharply opposing social stakes and opinions, the 
drafting of this one had to make use of some highly visible 
postponements in order to keep the main constitutional negotiation from 
going off the rails.  By “postponements,” I mean decisions by the drafters 
to leave certain divisive issues to be dealt with in the future by the 
country’s political and judicial authorities.  Most famously, the drafters 
deliberately ducked the question of the constitutionality of the death 
penalty and left it for the Constitutional Court to decide, the so-called 
“Solomonic solution.”42  But that is only one among several salient 
instances. 
The Constitution requires and promises an equitable redistribution 
of land and natural resources,43 and it simultaneously guarantees 
security of property holdings against uncompensated expropriation.44  
The Constitution guarantees everyone’s access to adequate food, water, 
health care, and housing,45 and it simultaneously describes the state’s 
corresponding obligation in terms of “reasonable . . . measures” to be 
                                                 
38  See supra note 29. 
39  See, e.g., Jackie Dugard, Court of First Instance?  Towards Pro-Poor Jurisdiction for the 
South African Constitutional Court, 22 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 262 (2006); Sandra Liebenberg, 
Water rights reduced to a trickle, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, Oct. 21, 2009, 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-10-21-water-rights-reduced-to-a-trickle (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2010). 
40  Such complaints appear (for example) in Ngoepe, supra note 29. 
41  See, e.g., Hlophe Calls for Africanisation of SA Law, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, July 10, 
2009 http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-07-10-hlophe-calls-for-africanisation-of-sa-law 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2010). 
42  See S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), ¶¶ 22–25 (S. Afr.). 
43  See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 25(5). 
44  See id. s 25(2)(b), (3). 
45  See id. ss 26(1), 27(1). 
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taken “within its available resources.”46  The Constitution guarantees 
respect and protection for cultural self-determination47 and for 
indigenous law and leadership,48 and it simultaneously guarantees the 
protection of every person’s equality before the law and freedom from 
unfair discrimination, naming sex-based discrimination as 
presumptively unfair.49 
You might think you see puzzles or contradictions lurking in some 
or all of those pairings of constitutional commitments.  You might be 
right.  You can be sure, though, that the contradictions did not result 
from blindness on the drafters’ part.  Obviously, they reflect the drafters’ 
recognition of  intractable complexity in the issues involved, and a more-
or-less desperate decision by them to rely on politicians, lawyers, and 
judges, working in context, in good faith and over time, to come up with 
pragmatic resolutions that all parties could find decent and acceptable—
if, sometimes, only barely or even bitterly so.  No one ever would have 
imagined that the Constitutional Court could work its way through these 
entanglements without raising sharp complaints from some or another 
group of stakeholders. 
And, no surprise, the Court has not succeeded in doing that.  The 
question, though, is whether it has found ways, or bids fair to find ways, 
of doing sufficient justice to all sides of these controversies to redeem (if I 
may now revert to the opening part of this lecture) the legitimation-
worthiness of the Constitution entrusted to its care. 
And that brings me, then, to the matter of civil rights law that I have 
said would provide the core of this talk.  I will focus on one case decided 
by the Constitutional Court, under the name of Bhe.50  The Bhe case 
involves a feature of indigenous law that property lawyers call “male 
primogeniture.”  It is a feature that comes into play in deciding the 
inheritance of property from a person who dies without leaving a will.  
Male primogeniture means, first, that only males get to inherit.  It also 
means that only one person succeeds to all the property—that person 
being the eldest male member of the class of survivors closest in blood 
relationship to the deceased.  Typically, that will be an eldest son, but it 
can also be a father, uncle, nephew, or cousin. 
Before getting further into the Bhe case, I need to fill you in a bit 
more on some relevant constitutional texts.  Section 8, the so-called 
application clause, stipulates that the Bill of Rights applies to “all law,” 
                                                 
46  See id. ss 26(2), 27(2). 
47  See id. ss 30, 31. 
48  See id. s 211. Sections 30, 31, and 211 are more fully described and discussed below. 
49  See id. s 9(3). 
50  See generally Bhe v. Khayalitsha Magistrate, 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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which seemingly must include customary law.  Section 30, on language 
and culture, gives to everyone the right to “participate in the cultural life 
of their choice,” but the text immediately goes on to add that no one is 
licensed to do so “in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill 
of Rights.”  Section 31, on cultural communities, gives members of 
cultural communities the right to “enjoy their culture;” but, again, the 
section immediately goes on to say that this does not grant any 
exemption from other provisions in the Bill of Rights.  Section 9, the 
equality clause of the Bill of Rights, gives everyone a right against 
“unfair discrimination,” and it specifically defines discrimination on 
grounds of sex or gender to be unfair, by a rebuttable presumption. 
One constitutional provision outside of the Bill of Rights has a direct 
bearing on the Bhe case.  Section 211 guarantees the operation of systems 
of customary law under traditional leadership, and it furthermore directs 
the state’s regular courts to apply customary law wherever applicable.  
Again, however, the text immediately goes on to say that this is to be 
done only “subject to the Constitution.”51 
Let us now come to the case of Bhe.  For the sake of simplicity, 
clarity, and speed, I am going to alter the factual and legal background a 
little, but not in any way that is material to our discussion.  A man to 
whom Ms. Bhe was married at the time died without having made a will.  
The couple had been living and working in the city of Cape Town with 
their two young daughters, in a shack on land to which the husband held 
the title.  He also owned some personal property, including building 
materials for a permanent home.  Some or all of these assets had been 
acquired through the joint efforts of the deceased and Ms. Bhe.  The 
magistrate in the case (a state judicial official roughly equivalent, for our 
purposes, to a probate judge) awarded the entire estate away from Ms. 
Bhe and her daughters, to the decedent’s nearest living male relative, 
who happened to be his father.  The magistrate thus acted in accordance 
with what he took to be the applicable rule of African customary law, 
male primogeniture.  He did so despite the father’s declared intention of 
selling away the land where Ms. Bhe and her daughters had been living, 
                                                 
51  S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 211(1).  To make the survey complete, we should note that the 
Constitution establishes a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, to which it assigns important powers and 
duties of research, education, mediation, and advocacy.  See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 185; 
Luphert Chilwane, Commission Takes Up Dispute Over Bull Ritual, BUSINESS DAY, Dec. 18, 
2009, available at http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=89843 (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2010) (reporting on the Commission’s initiative to achieve mutual 
understanding between Animal Rights Africa and the Zulu traditional leadership in regard 
to an annual first-fruits ceremony involving the killing of a bull). 
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in order to repay himself for the expenses of his son’s funeral, leaving 
Ms. Bhe and her girls to live who knows where, or how. 
Now, that is not how the estate would have gone under the state’s 
general Intestate Succession Act, the standard law that applies to cases of 
intestacy outside the customary-law situation.  That law provides for sex-
neutral inheritance; it places spouses and children first in line, ahead of 
their in-laws and grandparents; and it divides estates equitably among 
the surviving spouse and children.  And so you might be asking 
yourself:  On what fair basis could a magistrate decide that this was a 
customary-law situation to be governed by male primogeniture, rather 
than one to be governed by the standard law of the state?  In general, the 
answer would have to be that it was because the couple had entered 
their marriage under customary law, or had otherwise been living as a 
part of a traditional community.  In those conditions, the combined effect 
of section 30 (granting people rights to participate in the cultural life of 
their choice) and section 211 of the Constitution (providing for the 
operation of customary legal systems and directing state judges to apply 
customary law where applicable) does, indeed, appear to be that the 
magistrate must decide the line of inheritance from Ms. Bhe’s deceased 
husband in accordance with customary law. 
But, of course Ms. Bhe went to court claiming that the customary 
rule at issue in this case, the rule of inheritance by males only, is 
unconstitutional.  (By direction of section 8, remember, the Bill of Rights 
applies to “all law”).  As you might expect, given my description of the 
relevant constitutional texts, the Constitutional Court agreed with that 
proposition.  Customary law, the Court said, “is protected by and subject 
to the Constitution in its own right”, as “an integral part of our law;” but, 
still, customary law must “first and foremost answer[] to the contents of 
the Constitution.”52  The Court concluded that “[t]he exclusion of women 
from inheritance on the grounds of gender is a clear violation” of the 
Constitution’s guarantee, in section 9, against sex-based discrimination.53 
The Constitution directs the Court to declare invalid any law that it 
finds to be inconsistent with constitutional requirements.54  But the 
Court, in this case, could not simply do that and stop.  That would have 
left a gap in the customary law; there would have been no rule, then, to 
govern inheritance in the customary law situation.  So what did the 
Court do?  Using power that the Constitution grants it to craft just and 
equitable remedial orders,55 the Court decreed that succession to 
                                                 
52  Bhe, (1) SA 580 ¶¶. 41, 43. 
53  Id. at ¶ 91. 
54  See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 172(1)(a). 
55  See id. s 172(b). 
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property in the customary law situation would be governed by the 
state’s regular rules of inheritance,56 unless and until Parliament should 
legislate some different solution (which would, of course, itself have to 
pass constitutional muster). 
Here we reach an important point.  The Court had been urged to 
adopt a different form of remedy, which arguably would have signified 
a greater depth of commitment to the respected status of customary law 
and its future place in the lives of the people.  The Constitution contains 
an important section 39(2) directing courts, when applying common or 
customary law, to construe and develop that law in line with “the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”57  Just as American courts are 
expected to revise and adjust common law rules in response to changes 
in society and in prevailing societal values and understandings, so the 
judges in this case might have treated the customary rule of male 
primogeniture.  Rather than simply discarding the rule as impossibly 
sexist and out of step, the Court might have done the customary rule the 
honor—so to speak—of treating it as no less worthy than, say, some 
outmoded rule in the common law of contract of judicial attention and 
care to bring it into line with the evolution in social conditions and 
values represented by the Constitution. 
Exactly that course was urged by one of the Court’s eleven members.  
Interestingly, that single dissenter from the Court’s remedial order was 
Justice Sandile Ngcobo, who has just recently become the Chief Justice, 
replacing the retired Justice Pius Langa, who wrote for the majority of 
ten in the Bhe case.  Justice Ngcobo would have had the Court develop 
the primogeniture rule, but also preserve it.  He would have done this by 
simply removing the reference to males.58  That would result, for 
example, in having the eldest surviving child, regardless of gender, 
succeed to the entire estate, without any allowance for a surviving 
spouse or division with other children—a result quite different from 
what happens under the state’s standard rules of inheritance. 
We will come back soon to Justice Ngcobo’s remedial proposal.  
Before we do, we must take note that, as a matter of fact, the majority’s 
opinion in Bhe lays the groundwork for exactly such a proposal.  That 
groundwork essentially consists of two propositions, which both 
opinions, the majority’s and Justice Ngcobo’s, explain with care.  First, 
the primogeniture rule arose in a state of society and a cultural context in 
which it served a benign purpose, but which have largely passed out of 
                                                 
56  See Bhe, (1) SA 580 at ¶ 136(6). 
57  See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s 39(2). 
58  See id. at ¶¶ 218–22 (Ngcobo, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Michelman: Legitimation by Constitution (and the News from South Africa)
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
1028 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
existence.59  Second, in the absence of positive assistance from the state’s 
judicial and legislative bodies, the customary law available for 
application in the state courts of South Africa is blocked from the normal 
path of evolution to keep up with changes in society.60 
As the opinions explain, the rule of inheritance by male 
primogeniture arose within a strongly communal and familial form of 
social life.  It was a part of a system containing ample safeguards for 
fairness and welfare, based on the cohesion and stability of extended 
family groups on which everyone depended for production, sustenance, 
and emotional support.  Property—of which by far the most important 
component was pastoral and agricultural land—was, in substance, 
collectively owned.  As nominal holder of the title, the extended family 
head administered the patrimony for the welfare of the family unit as a 
whole; he held the title, so to speak, in trust for the family.  When a 
family head died, the “heir”—as we call this person today, somewhat 
inaptly—stepped into his shoes and assumed all the obligations attached 
to the headship role.  Dependents of the deceased, or maybe better call 
them family constituents, continued as family constituents of the 
successor.  The successor acquired the duty to ensure the maintenance 
and support of all members of the family, and to administer the estate to 
that end only.  As Justice Ngcobo further explains, there was a real 
reason (granting that one could not call it a purely gender-neutral 
reason) for preferring males as successors to family headships.  Women, 
upon marriage, were expected to leave their natal families and join the 
families of their husbands, and would not, therefore, be suitably situated 
for headship responsibility toward their families of birth.61 
Needless to say, and as both opinions emphasize, the world has 
changed drastically since then, in ways that the facts of the Bhe case 
perfectly typify.  In the words of the majority: 
Nuclear families have largely replaced traditional 
extended families.  The heir does not necessarily live 
together with the whole extended family which would 
include the spouse of the deceased as well as other 
dependants and descendants.  He often simply acquires 
                                                 
59  See id. at ¶¶ 75–76, 80, 83–84 (majority opinion); id. at ¶¶ 156–74, 188–90 (Ngcobo, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
60  See id. at ¶¶ 82, 84–90 (majority opinion); id. at ¶¶ 153–55, 175–77 (Ngcobo, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
61  See id. at ¶ 174 (Ngcobo, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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the estate without assuming, or even being in a position 
to assume, any of the deceased’s responsibilities.62 
In short, for what is doubtless a majority of that fraction of today’s 
South Africans who retain, in many ways, their attachment to traditional 
ways and customary legal institutions, the male primogeniture rule is 
simply out of whack.  It does not work.  Originally a part of a scheme for 
social solidarity and collective security, it has turned into an engine of 
rank unfairness and abuse. 
Why, then, has there been no internal evolution of the body of 
customary law to reflect these changes?  The answer given by both 
opinions in the Bhe case is that such development may well have taken 
place; but any such development will have occurred indigenously—in 
non-formal, off-record ways that fail to make the changes readily visible, 
as general rules of law to be applied by outsider, state tribunals such as 
the magistrate’s court.  The problem is one of deviation of the living law 
on the ground from the law frozen in the books.  During the nineteenth 
century, so-called African customary law was codified in rule form by 
colonial treatise writers and legislators, and the result has been to lock in 
its tracks what the state’s tribunals have since been able to recognize as 
customary law.  As the Bhe majority writes, with obviously sincere 
sympathy and regret, “[t]he outcome has been formalisation and 
fossilisation of a system which by its nature should function in an active 
and dynamic manner.”63 
We are now in a position to attempt an assessment of the Bhe 
majority’s rejection of Justice Ngcobo’s proposal that the Constitutional 
Court should develop—and, by doing so, should respect and preserve—
the customary law of inheritance; that is, by recasting primogeniture into 
a gender-neutral form.  One obvious objection to that, noticed by Justice 
Ngcobo himself, is, again, the change in social conditions.  In the Bhe 
case, for example, awarding the entire estate, outright, to the elder of the 
two young sisters would make no sense and do no justice.64  In such a 
situation, hardly non-typical, the state’s standard rules for 
administration and division of intestate property will do a much better 
job. 
That, however, does not seem to have been the majority’s primary 
reason for declining to make the Constitutional Court the default 
developer of the content of customary law.  For the majority, that 
suggestion seemed to pose an insuperable difficulty of evidence.  
                                                 
62  Bhe, (1) SA 580 at ¶ 80 (majority opinion). 
63  Id. at ¶ 90. 
64  See id. at ¶ 241 (Ngcobo, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Whatever the development was to be, it should reflect what the majority 
called “the true content of customary law as it is today.”65  And, given 
the indigenous, non-formalized nature of customary legal change, and 
the uncertainties and disputes that necessarily must attend such 
processes, the majority seemed to doubt its capacity, by the normal 
means of judicial evidence-taking, to decide what is now to stand as an 
authoritative rendition of the current state of customary law.  The 
majority was also concerned that an inevitably protracted and piecemeal 
process of judicial verification of indigenous legal change would result in 
an unacceptable postponement of the urgent, civic claims of women to 
nondiscriminatory treatment.  Pending any action from Parliament, the 
best they could do right away, the majority thought, was to order 
application of the state’s standard rules to cases of inheritance in a 
customary law situation.66 
Not so, said Justice Ngcobo, we can do better.  First, we must 
gender-neutralize the customary rule of primogeniture.  But then, 
second, instead of a wholesale throw-over of the traditional form of 
inheritance by one person of entire family estates, which may still be just 
right for some traditional, rural families and communities, we must leave 
it to the parties concerned to decide whether to endorse that form of 
inheritance or, instead, to choose division under the state’s standard 
rules.  And, in case of the parties’ inability to agree, we must direct the 
state’s magistrates to decide which form of inheritance should apply in 
the case at hand, having regard to what would be fair and equitable in 
the circumstances.67  To be sure, said Justice Ngcobo, that would result, 
sometimes, in differing treatments for inheritance, depending on 
whether the matter falls inside or outside the customary law situation.  
But this kind and degree of legal pluralism, he added, is dictated by the 
Constitution’s recognition of the rights of communities to live and be 
governed by indigenous law.  It is, he said, “a recognition of our 
diversity, which is an important feature of our constitutional 
democracy.”68 
In developments subsequent to the Bhe decision—I think especially 
of a striking decision called Shilubana69 involving the rules of succession 
to customary community leadership—there are clear signs that the 
Constitutional Court as a whole really shares the dispositions for which 
                                                 
65  Id. at ¶ 109 (majority opinion). 
66  See id. at ¶¶ 110–16. 
67  See Bhe, (1) SA 580 at ¶¶ 229–34, 236–39 (Ngcobo, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
68  Id. at ¶ 235. 
69  Shilubana v. Nwamitwa, 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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Justice Ngcobo spoke out in Bhe.70  I mean a disposition to heed and to 
encourage internal development of the old ways by the communities 
themselves, so that they, themselves, work out an understanding of the 
tradition’s true reflection of the Constitution’s paradigm of rights; plus a 
judicial disposition to conduct serious, evidentiary inquiries, in litigated 
cases, into the contemporary content of the living customary law; plus a 
disposition to shoulder, when necessary, the judicial responsibility of 
directly developing indigenous law to keep it in tune with the 
Constitution.71  The Constitutional Court, today, under Justice Ngcobo’s 
leadership, might be described as poised to exert itself to the utmost to 
give maximum possible space and respect to customary law, within 
outer bounds laid down by the Bill of Rights. 
Suppose that is truly the case and the rest of the South African state 
judiciary, government, and Parliament, will do their best to follow suit.  
Where would that leave the concerns I mentioned earlier, about a deep 
and de-legitimizing failure of justice and fitness in the Constitution, by 
reason of a massive, imposed displacement of African indigenous social 
ideals by a Eurocentric-liberal system based on an essentially 
contestational, as opposed to solidaristic, form of democratic politics, 
and on respect and protection for an individualistic conception of human 
dignity, as opposed to the pursuit of collective being? 
By posing that question, I mean to redeem my promise to tie up 
South Africa’s indigenous law debate with the theoretical proposition of 
legitimation by Constitution.  The question—crudely put—would be 
whether the asserted clash between the African and the European social 
and political outlooks is so deep and drastic that one group or the other 
is, inevitably, going to experience a profound disaffection for, and 
                                                 
70  See Gumede (born Shange) v. President of the Republic, 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC) (S. Afr.) 
(declaring invalid a statutory codification of a gender-discriminatory, customary-legal 
scheme of marital property, while noting both the ”fossilization” of customary law 
wrought by the codification and the judicial obligation to develop customary law in 
harmony with the Constitution, where not blocked by statute from doing so).  See generally 
id. at ¶¶ 16, 18, 20–21, 29. 
71  All of these dispositions are manifest in Shilubana, (2) SA 66.  In that case, unlike in 
Bhe, the Constitutional Court did see fit, as prompted by Constitution Section 39(2), to 
develop customary law in keeping with the spirit, purport, and objects of the bill of rights.  
The Court did not, however, do so in a way that put it into the position of dictating to the 
community a gender-neutralizing alteration in the community’s indigenous law of 
succession to rulership.  Rather, the Court intervened at a secondary level, that of the 
community’s rules for accomplishing customary legal change.  The Court engineered a 
development of the secondary rules so as to remove a procedural blockage, thus enabling 
plausibly identified, traditional authorities to put into effect a pending, contested, gender-
neutralizing revision of the primary succession rule. 
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disengagement from, this Constitution (and, perhaps, from any 
constitution that might have been written for the country). 
On a purely speculative level, it seems to me that one could go either 
way with this.  Assume, first, that the courts and the government can 
succeed in conveying a credible, honest commitment to go as far as the 
Constitution allows in respecting and nurturing indigenous law and can 
do so, in the words of Yvonne Mokgoro, a recently retired South African 
justice, “creatively, strategically, and with ingenuity,” with a view to the 
rise of “a new indigenous law and jurisprudence” that can meet “the 
demands of constitutionalism”72 while also, reciprocally, helping to 
shape a new, distinctively “South African constitutional value system.”73  
Then, maybe, bearing in mind the obvious advantages to everyone from 
stable and decent government in South African territory, the 
disappointment, disagreement, and frustration suffered by the losers in 
these disputes—whichever side they may be on—need not and will not 
deepen and harden into the kind of profound disaffection from the 
system that threatens legitimacy. 
But what if we assume, instead, that those critics are right who say 
that the Constitution’s refusal to submit the country, unconditionally, to 
total, political-cultural Africanization (whatever we think that might 
mean in practice) is an ultimately non-assimilable failure of both simple 
justice to the colonially dispossessed peoples in the area and fitness to 
their deeply ingrained visions of society?  On that premise, it could seem 
that no possible notion of legitimation by constitution—and certainly not 
by this Constitution—can work for South Africa. 
Whether that would turn out, ultimately, to be good or bad news for 
some or all South Africans is a question at the core of some of the debates 
that I have, all too sketchily, been trying to describe.  In either case, 
though, it may not be altogether encouraging news for political theories 
of legitimation by constitution.  Because, one might ask—and South 
Africans may want to ponder seriously—which constitution will be 
legitimation-worthy in South Africa, if this one is not? 
Of course, we cannot exclude, a priori, that the answer to that 
question is “none.”  If we find that prospect unwelcome, we might want 
to consider whether we do best to think of the Constitution as a one-off 
done deal, a sealed and settled contract to be abided by until 
                                                 
72  Yvonne Mokgoro, Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa, Paper delivered at the first 
Colloquium Constitution and Law held at Potchefstroomt, South Africa, (Oct. 31, 1997), 
available at http://ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/view/43567/27090 (last visited Mar. 
24, 2010). 
73  Yvonne Mokgoro, The Customary Law Question in the South African Constitution, 41 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1279, 1280 (1997). 
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overthrown—or, rather, to think of it as a project, a work in progress, the 
legitimacy and success of which do now, and will always, rest in the care 
and keeping of a society whose constitution it is still (or, rather, might or 
might not still be) in a state of becoming. 
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